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The Central Panel: A Response to Critics
By John Hardwicke and Thomas E. Ewing*
The central panel movement appears to be quickening. Louisiana
established a panel in 1996; Oregon and Michigan in 2000; Alaska in
2004. There are now twenty-seven state, and three city, central
panels. Other states, in varying degrees of progress, are considering
the establishment of their own.
No central panel is created without a champion - it may be the
governor or other elected official, legislature, private bar, or citizen
organizations. But there is also resistance, often white-hot. The
objections are the same: cost, loss of agency expertise,
judicialization of administrative hearings, and creation of yet another
state bureaucracy. The purpose of this article is to answer those
objections, drawing upon the authors' experiences in their own panels
and also the many years of interactions with other state chief
administrative law judges in the organization and operation of central
panels.
The authors have relied considerably on data from Oregon's
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which began operations
on January 1, 2000. This is a particularly useful laboratory in which
to explore central panel issues, especially efficiencies, since it is a
relatively new panel. It bills for services on an assessment method,
and thus has collected useful information on hours, costs, and
referrals. And, finally, as one of the largest panels in the nation (135
permanent employees in 2000), with seven consolidated hearings
units ranging from one to forty-five employees, fiscal and other
effects can be analyzed at several different levels.
This is intended as a practical guide for governors, legislators,
agency heads, and others - anyone either interested in, or threatened
* John Hardwicke served as Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of
Administrative Hearings, State of Maryland, from 1990-2002. He is currently
Executive Director of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges,
University of Baltimore Law School, Baltimore, Maryland. Thomas E. Ewing has
been the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings,
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by, the prospect of a central panel in their state. Accordingly, there
will be little of the scholarly gloss that typically accompanies law
review articles.'
I. MISSION OF A CENTRAL PANEL
The mission of a central panel can be simply stated: to provide
the public, both citizens and businesses, with an independent forum
in which to dispute agency action. Stated differently, in the old
system, the judge, generally called a hearing officer, is an in-house
employee of the agency. This makes the agency simultaneously the
policeman, prosecutor, judge, and jury of its own action. Inevitably,
such a system creates, at the very least, an appearance of bias; at
worst, the reality of either direct or indirect pressure on these
employees to produce decisions favorable to the agency. 2
The problem with appearance is obvious. However carefully an
agency erects a "Chinese Wall" between its regulatory staff and
administrative law judges (ALds), citizens do not know that. If they
do know it, they do not believe it. What citizens know is this: they
are fighting the agency, and they want a fair hearing. When they
enter the hearing room and learn that the judge presiding over the
case is an employee of their adversary, no explanation will persuade
them, especially if they lose, that the outcome was not
predetermined.
Agency pressure is a more complex question. There is abundant
anecdotal evidence of agency hearings managers directing ALds in
individual cases to produce desired outcomes, irrespective of the
facts and the law. In the personal experience of the authors,
however, such blatant interference is uncommon. What is much
more common is indirect pressure, such as the desire of an AU to
please a supervisor, to rise within agency ranks or to remain friendly
1. Those interested in reading more on central panels may consult John W.
Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: A Work in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
419 (2001); Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J.NAALJ 57
(2003); and Oregon's Office of Administrative Hearings: A Postscript, 24 J.NAALJ
21(2004).
2. An employee is, by legal definition, a "servant" of his or her employer - that
is, part of the master-servant relation as presented in law school and referred to by
the courts. As such, and different from the independent contractor, an employee is
subject in many ways, some subtle, some direct, to the will of the employer.
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with agency staff who participated in the decision litigated at the
hearing.
It can flow too from hearing managers seeing themselves as a
part of, not separate from, the agency management structure. In one
Oregon hearing unit, for example, ALJs inspected files prior to
hearings to ensure that all documents necessary for the state to prove
every element of its case were present. They reviewed jurisdictional
notices for legal sufficiency; if insufficient, cases were dismissed
without prejudice to allow the agency to refile. They were instructed
to ignore a statute which, the agency feared, would give them too
much discretion in conducting license suspension hearings. In these
examples (there are others), the judges were not independent
adjudicators. They were active, if invisible to the public, prosecutors
of the agency's case.
II. COST
Experience has shown that a central panel is inherently more
cost-effective than separate, independent hearings units. There are
two reasons for this: economies of scale and flexibility in case
assignment. The benefits of economies of scale are most visible for
agencies with high-volume hearing needs (perhaps a thousand or
more annual referrals). The benefits of flexibility in case assignment
are most visible for agencies with low-volume hearing needs (a few
hundred referrals a year).
Before examining this subject further, a word about start-up
costs. Start-up costs can be a deal-breaker in the establishment of a
central panel. In Oregon, in 1997, a bill was passed to create a
central panel as a stand-alone agency. It was estimated that the net
additional cost to the state would be almost $2 million. The
Governor vetoed the bill, declaring that Oregon could not afford it.
In 1999, another effort was made to create a central panel,
substantially larger than the one contemplated in 1997. But this time
the panel was to be supported by a different agency, and hearing staff
were to remain physically located in their former parent agencies, at
least for a time. Actual start-up costs were $92,000.
A. Economies of Scale
Just as an automobile plant can produce 1000 cars more
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efficiently than one producing 100, a hearings unit issuing 1000
orders a month can do so more efficiently than one issuing 100. This
is the result of shared resources: case management systems,
operational staff, vehicles, office space, and so on. Moreover, a
larger hearing unit has the capacity, simply by virtue of its size, to
absorb a greater amount of additional work than does a smaller one.
Here are some examples of the "macro" efficiencies gained in
Oregon at the OAH and individual (large-volume) hearing unit
levels:
" In fiscal year 3 2000-01, the average number of OAH
hours per referral was 8.55. By 2002-03, it had dropped
to 7.13, a reduction of seventeen percent. Similarly, in
2000-01, the average cost of a referral was $322. In
2002-03, it was $285, a reduction of eleven percent. This
was a total cost savings to the state of Oregon in 2002-03
of $1.4 million.
* In addition to the hearings of the seven agencies whose
hearings units were consolidated into the OAH, the
legislature mandated that another sixty-two agencies were
to use the services of the OAH. In calendar year 2000,
this was the equivalent of 3.5 full-time equivalents
(FTEs).4 That work was absorbed into the OAH without
the addition of any permanent employees.
" The average cost of Department of Transportation
referrals (about 6000 annually) dropped by six percent,
from $581 in 2000-01 to $544 in 2002-03. The average
hours per referral dropped by nine percent, from 14.8 to
13.4. In 2002-03, the Department saved $232,158.'
3. Oregon's fiscal year is July 1 to June 30. Unless noted differently, all years
are fiscal years.
4. FTEs are calculated on the basis of 2088 hours available to an employee in a
year.
5. Cost savings for individual agencies are calculated on the basis of salaries
plus benefits. Because they do not include associated services and supplies, the
savings are understated.
The average cost of Department of Human Services
referrals (about 3000-4000 annually) dropped by twenty-
three percent, from $401 in 2000-01 to $309 in 2002-03.
The average number of hours per referral dropped by
twenty-six percent, from 9.4 to 7.0. In 2002-03, the
Department saved $371,600.
B. Flexibility in Case Assignment
For low-volume hearings, economies of scale are less visible;
certainly they are harder to document. But, membership in a central
panel brings no less of a fiscal benefit. The reason is this: with high-
volume hearings, increases or decreases in referrals tend to be slower
and less dramatic, allowing management to respond more efficiently
by making appropriate staffing assignments. With low-volume
hearings, however, there is much greater volatility, upwards and
downwards. Aggravating this is the fact that low-volume hearings
(often licensing-type cases) tend to be the lengthier kind of case.
There is never a perfect mathematical equation between the work to
be done and the people to do the work. When cases decline, the
agency has capacity; when they increase, either the agency suffers a
backlog or it hires new staff. But, when cases decline again, as they
surely will, there is capacity once more.
A central panel cures this. Case referrals in different parts of a
panel are continually oscillating: going up and down. Staff can
easily be assigned where the need exists. Here are some examples:
" The Water Resources Department (WRD) transferred one
AU to the OAH. At the time of transfer, only about thirty
percent of her time was actually used for hearings, yet the
WRD was paying for a full-time AU. The OAH assigned
her to other agency hearings, which was an annual salary
savings for the Department in 2000-01 of $48,000.
" In 2001 and afterwards, the WRD became involved in a
very complex water-rights litigation, requiring 1.75 (AU
and clerical) FTEs worth of work. The Department would
have been forced to hire additional staff, but the OAH was
able to absorb the cost.
The Central Panel: A Response to CriticsFall 2004
236 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-2
" The Department of Consumer and Business Services
transferred four ALJs and two clerical staff to the OAH.
However, it had only 3.75 FTEs worth of work at the time
of transfer. The OAH turned this excess capacity, 2.25
FFEs, to other hearings, which was a salary savings in
2000-01 of $180,000.
" The Oregon Liquor Control Commission transferred three
ALJs and one clerical staff to the OAH. However, it had
only 3.3 FTEs worth of work. The excess capacity was
assigned to other cases in the OAH, which was a salary
savings of $56,000 in 2000-01.
" In 2000-01 the Liquor Control Commission referred 129
cases to the OAH, using the services of 4.2 FTEs. By
2002-03, the number of referrals dropped to eighty-five
cases, requiring the services of 2.7 FTEs. Without the
OAH, this excess capacity would either have been laid off
or (more likely) remain idle. This capacity was assigned
other cases in the OAH, saving the Commission
approximately $140,800 in 2002-03 alone.
Other central panel states have experienced the same cost
reductions. Maryland went from a total of ninety ALJs prior to the
establishment of its central panel in 1991, to fifty-three by 1993;
there was a corresponding reduction in operational staff. By the
second year of its existence, the OAH saved the state of Maryland
almost $828,000.6 Colorado also saw a reduction in staff. New
Jersey went from 136 ALJs (hearing examiners) to forty-three.
Without the panel, New Jersey would have spent $20 million on
hearings; in the event, it spent only $7.5 million. In late 1994, the
Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings reported a seventy
percent drop in cost of its hearings. 7 In Minnesota, the cost of
hearings for the Public Utilities Commission pre-panel was $400,000.
6. John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and
Implementation in Maryland, 14 J.NAALJ 5, 40-41 (1994).
7. Gerald E. Ruth, Unification of the Administrative Adjudicatory Process: An
Emerging Framework to Increase "Judicialization" in Pennsylvania, 16 J.NAALJ
221, 252-53 (1996).
In the first year of the panel's operation, it dropped to $311,330; it
dropped again in the following year to $234,000. The state of
Minnesota saved $100,000 (out of a budget of approximately
$900,000) in 1978 alone.8
III. Loss OF AGENCY EXPERTISE
Mythology and false assumptions surround this issue. The
mythology is that only "expert" ALJs can handle the particular
agency's subject matter. The false assumptions are, first, that "non-
experts" will be hearing agencies' cases; second, that these non-
experts will ignore agency policy and agency law. These
propositions, like all unexamined propositions, have gained a truth in
the retelling.
A. The Mythology of Expertise
Typically, agency employees at all levels believe that their
particular subject matter is sufficiently esoteric that only expert ALJs
can truly understand it. For example, in 1999, the Commissioner of
the Real Estate Agency (REA) sought exemption from Oregon's
OAH, arguing that only judges with a real estate background were
qualified to handle REA hearings. Two years later, he conceded that
OAH ALJs were doing a good job. The Director of the Veteran's
Administration (VA) testified that VA cases required special
expertise in federal law and that Oregon's bonding authority would
be jeopardized without exemption. Four years later, that authority is
intact. The Board of Optometry, the Veterinary Medical Examining
Board, and others sought exemptions based on the same argument of
expertise.
Pride is a commendable thing. But the authors of this article have
never seen a case so complex that only an agency expert could judge
it. After the establishment of Oregon's OAH and thereafter, ALJs
were competently handling agency hearings - so competently, in fact,
that in 2003, when the legislature was considering making the OAH
permanent, not a single agency voice was raised in opposition. Nor
8. Duane R. Harves, Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient and
Effective: How the AL Central Panel System Works in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE
257, 263-64 (1981).
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did a single agency head complain that expertise had eroded over the
previous three years. This is because there had been no erosion.
Agencies continued to apply their expertise - in the rules they wrote,
the inspections they conducted, and the penalties they imposed.
Nothing changed.
"Loss of agency expertise," when correctly understood, is the loss
of insider knowledge. It is the bundle of shared beliefs regarding
industry practices. It is the knowledge, gained by employees over the
years, of the agency's culture, the industry it regulates, and the law it
applies. Insider knowledge may strengthen agency performance, but
it threatens fundamental fairness. If relevant to a decision, this
knowledge should be presented openly at a hearing and be subject to
cross-examination. It must be tested by an independent judge, not by
an insider.
B. False Assumptions
False assumptions are also at work. The first false assumption is
that ALJs, wholly ignorant of the statutes and rules governing the
agency and the industry it regulates, will be assigned to its cases. In
fact, in the formation of every central panel, ALJs who specialized in
a particular agency's subject matter pre-panel, continued to hear those
cases post-panel. The conversion was transparent. Moreover, all
chief ALJs endeavor to assign only those ALJs knowledgeable in the
agency's subject, especially if that knowledge is necessary to an
efficient hearing.
The other false assumption is that only an AU specially trained
in the agency's subject matter can produce a legally correct order. It
is true that special training can be helpful, even necessary, in some
particular areas. For example, in those involving the complex
intersection of federal and state statutes and rules, special training
can be extremely helpful. Central panels provide that training. But
in most other areas, outcomes depend less on knotty legal analyses
than on complicated factual situations. One does not need to be a
forester to competently decide a forestry case; a scientist to decide an
environmental case; a physician to decide a medical board case.
Fundamentally, what is required is an ability to apply the law
accurately, and to analyze facts and weigh them appropriately.
9
C. Conclusion
A study by Oregon's OAH clearly demonstrates how extravagant
are agencies' fear of "loss of expertise." The study reviewed 344
proposed orders issued by the OAH during the first three years of its
existence, from 2000-2002, on behalf of licensing boards and
commissions. Eighty-seven percent (299) of the orders affirmed the
agencies' proposed actions. Thirteen percent (45) disaffirmed. Half
(22) of the disaffirmances were on legal grounds - that is, there was
no dispute regarding the facts, only their legal effect. The other half
(23) were on factual grounds. Agencies issued 29910 final orders
from those proposed orders. Ninety-five percent (283) affirmed the
proposed orders, although in a few instances the agencies either
increased (16) or reduced (12) the sanctions recommended by the
ALJs. Only five percent (16) of the final orders disaffirmed the
proposed orders. Of that number, ten disaffirmances were on legal
grounds, and six were on factual grounds (generally, the agency
preferring to rely on the evidence of its own witnesses).
The conclusion is clear. Oregon's ALJs did not run amok with
agency statutes and rules as was feared." 1 On the contrary, OAH
orders overwhelmingly affirmed agency actions. Of the agency
disaffirmances of OAH proposed orders, only seven percent were for
legal reasons. What may be even more interesting is that ninety-five
percent of agency final orders affirmed OAH proposed orders,
demonstrating that, in a number of instances, agencies preferred the
contrary outcomes proposed by ALJs. This data is further supported
by the customer satisfaction surveys completed by agencies during
the same period covered by the study: of the 285 agency responses,
ninety-eight percent were either satisfied (37 percent) or very
satisfied (61 percent) with OAH services. Only two percent
indicated dissatisfaction.
9. One solution to ease agency concerns is to give ALJs only proposed, or
recommended, order authority in selected cases.
10. The OAH was unable to collect all final orders issued from its proposed
orders. This failure explains the discrepancy between the number of OAH
proposed orders and agency final orders.
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IV. JUDICIALIZATION
Another fear is that a central panel will "judicialize"
administrative adjudication and that administrative hearings will
come to resemble circuit court proceedings, with Byzantine
pleadings, complex motion practice, and protracted discovery. All
this, according to the argument, undermines what should be the
nature of an administrative proceeding: that it is informal, swift, and
accessible to the average citizen.
There is no question that in the last sixty years, there has been a
trend in administrative law toward a more court-like process: cross-
examination, ex parte communications, discovery, notice of agency
action, and so on. However, this has not been caused by central
panels. It has been the result of the adoption of federal and state
administrative procedure acts beginning in 1945 and the elaboration
by the United States Supreme Court of due process safeguards for
citizens since the early 1970s. Judicialization has occurred with the
same vigor in states both with and without central panels.
If anything, a central panel produces some simplification in
administrative adjudication. States without central panels have
different hearings programs, each with its own procedures, ALJ job
descriptions, hiring practices and standards, websites, etc. With a
central panel, there is now one set of procedures, more consistency in
the quality of decisions, a single website to visit, and so on.
V. A "NEw BUREAUCRACY"
Finally, opponents argue that creation of a central panel produces
yet another "bureaucracy" which state governments cannot afford.
The issue of cost has already been addressed. Here, the authors will
look solely at the question of bureaucracy.
In general, a central panel does not create additional government.
Rather, it reduces the structure, and often the size, of a government
by consolidating several different bureaucracies into one. In Oregon
prior to the OAH, there were seven separate agency hearings units
with nine supervisors. After the OAH, there was a single
bureaucracy with eight managers - a reduction of one manager.
A consolidated central panel bureaucracy brings distinct benefits
to administrative adjudication. As a practical matter, hearings units
embedded in agencies are tolerated as necessary evils. This is
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understandable since no one likes being second-guessed. Often, and
as a result, hearings management is populated by agency insiders -
personnel intimately familiar with agency law and practices. It is this
background, agencies often believe, that guarantees legal accuracy in
hearings decisions. Accordingly, knowledge of the general principles
of administrative law and a preference for hiring ALJs with formal
legal training are regarded as less important, sometimes even a
handicap, to furthering the agency mission.
A central panel changes this. Professionals are now in charge (all
chief ALJs of central panels are required at a minimum to have law
degrees). This produces a different emphasis. ALJs are no longer
valued as "technocrats," but as professional judges. The quality of
training improves. Hiring standards often become more rigorous.
Collection and analysis of data become more important (in Oregon,
only a small fraction of the agencies requiring hearing services kept
any data whatsoever; of those that did, much of it was unreliable).
Timeliness improves. The quality of the work, rather than the
outcome, becomes more important.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most convincing argument is that no state that has
adopted a central panel has abolished it, reverting to the old system.
These states have discovered that central panels improve
government. The public trust is enlarged because citizens now have
an independent forum in which to litigate their cases. Agencies
benefit too. They are able to distance themselves from hearing orders
(as in "We didn't write this order; it's the OAH's fault."). They are
spared the fractious relationships that sometimes occur between
agency staff and ALJs (two Oregon agencies were delighted to have
their ALJs supervised by others). Costs are lower. The quality of
decisions does not deteriorate; generally it improves. Timeliness
does not deteriorate but often improves substantially.
Whether or not a state adopts a central panel should not depend
on the fears of cost, loss of expertise, judicialization, or
bureaucratization. These are groundless. Rather, it should depend on
the answer to a fundamental policy question: Is it the function of
administrative law judges to independently, truly independently,
review agency action, applying the law with the same neutrality and
outcome-indifference as does a judicial court? Or is it their function
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merely to meet the minimal due process requirements of notice and
hearing? If the former is true, only a central panel is sufficient. If
the latter is correct, agency hearings units will do. Every state must
decide for itself.
